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3.1 Introduction 
For a number of reasons, deflationists about truth favour a formal treat­
ment of the notion. What requirements deflationary formal theories of 
truth must satisfy is, thus, an important issue for deflationism. It is 
widely believed that compositional and Tarskian theories convey sub­
stantial concepts of truth or are otherwise unacceptable for the deflation­
ist. Call this claim the ‘incompatibility thesis’. Since compositional and 
Tarskian theories are often seen as superior to purely disquotational the­
ories, the incompatibility thesis, if true, would provide support for sub­
stantial theories of truth over their deflationary rivals. Assessing whether 
the arguments for the incompatibility thesis are correct is therefore of 
great philosophical importance. 
Here is the plan of the chapter. After some preliminaries (Section 3.2), 
we will rehearse six arguments for the incompatibility thesis from the lit­
erature (Section 3.3). We contend that most of these arguments issue 
from an overly narrow understanding of what role formal theories of 
truth are supposed to play. In Section 3.4, we introduce an important 
but often overlooked distinction between theories that are intended for 
a descriptive purpose (roughly, a theory that provides a faithful 
account of the basic usage of ‘true’) and those that are intended for a 
logical purpose (roughly, a theory that characterises the correctness of 
inferences involving ‘true’). 
The notion of a logical purpose raises the question what the role of ‘true’ 
exactly consists in, and what truth principles are needed to carry it out. 
Drawing on earlier work (Picollo and Schindler, 2018a), we suggest 
(Section 3.5) that this role is best understood as enabling us to mimic sen­
tential and predicate quantification within a first-order framework, and 
extract a criterion of functionality from that. However, not any theory 
that allows the truth predicate to fulfil its function might be acceptable 
to a deflationist: among other things, such a theory must not convey a sub­
stantial notion of truth. What this is supposed to mean is of course a con­
troversial issue. We will not be able to provide an absolute criterion of 
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substantiality, though we will propose (Section 3.6) a relative one: under 
certain circumstances, adding certain truth-theoretic principles to a defla­
tionary theory will not inflate the notion of truth. In Section 3.7 we will 
defend this criterion against a popular objection. 
In concluding this chapter (Section 3.8), we will survey a variety of 
formal truth theories and assess them in light of our criteria. It will be 
seen that a number of compositional and Tarskian truth theories are, 
plausibly, acceptable from a deflationary point of view and, therefore, 
do not encapsulate a substantial notion of truth. We conclude that the 
incompatibility thesis is false. Interestingly, our account also suggests 
that some popular compositional truth theories on the market are in 
fact not acceptable from a deflationary point of view. As we will 
argue, this does not constitute an embarrassment for deflationism, as 
there are good reasons to reject these theories on independent grounds. 
3.2 Deflationism and the Orthodoxy 
The variant of deflationism that will be the focus of this chapter consists 
of two fundamental claims. Some of its proponents are Field, Horsten, 
and Horwich, although their views might differ from each other in 
other, more satellite aspects. 
The first core thesis of deflationism is that ‘true’, as it is deployed in 
theoretical contexts, is a primitive term governed by some form of equiv­
alence between each truth ascription and the sentence or proposition 
itself to which truth is attributed to, i.e. by a so-called transparency prin­
ciple. We will refer to this as the ‘equivalence thesis’. This thesis is taken 
to suggest that there is no need or possibility of further conceptual anal­
ysis, no point in the search for an explicit definition of truth in terms of 
simpler, fundamentally more basic concepts—i.e. a substantial account. 
This is what distinguishes (this version of) deflationism from robust or 
substantive approaches to truth, such as the correspondence and the 
coherence theories, according to which there is a hidden nature of 
truth to uncover by means of an explicit definition, in which truth is ana­
lysed in terms of simpler concepts. Thus, deflationists sometimes claim 
that truth is not an ordinary or substantive property. 
The second fundamental thesis of deflationism is that the sole reason 
for having a truth predicate in natural language is that it plays an indis­
pensable logico-linguistic role. We will refer to this claim as the ‘logico­
linguistic function thesis’. For instance, the truth predicate allows us to 
endorse a single statement without explicitly articulating it, as in ‘Gold­
bach’s conjecture is true’, or several, even infinitely many statements at 
once, as in ‘All theorems of arithmetic are true’. It is this second thesis 
that distinguishes modern deflationism from its predecessor, the redun­
dancy theory of truth. While in sentences such as ‘“Snow is white” is 
true’ the truth predicate is easily eliminable and, therefore, dispensable, 
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this is not so in the case of the two examples given above. For we may 
not know what Goldbach’s conjecture is or what the theorems of arith­
metic are. And in the latter case, even if we did, there are too many of 
them to assert them one by one. 
There are several reasons why the deflationary account of truth moti­
vates a formal treatment of the notion. Some authors outright assert that 
truth is a primitive undefinable notion that must be axiomatised (cf. 
Halbach and Horsten, 2005). Moreover, the so-called transparency prin­
ciple that, according to the equivalence thesis, governs the truth predi­
cate is simple, schematic, and reminiscent of those governing logical 
vocabulary. In addition, despite its simplicity, transparency is riddled 
with paradoxes when unrestricted and formulated over sufficiently 
strong logics and base theories. To successfully avoid contradictions, 
precise formulations are needed. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
the study of the logico-linguistic function which deflationists—and many 
non-deflationists as well—attribute to the truth predicate based on the 
inferential behaviour of truth obviously demands a formal treatment. 
Indeed, recent years have seen a proliferation of formal truth theories, 
both in connection with and independently of deflationism. There has 
been much subsequent discussion about which formal properties a defla­
tionary truth theory can and should have. Most agree that deflationists 
should opt for axiomatic systems, which thus will be the focus of this 
chapter. Although we don’t directly address semantic theories, some of 
the arguments below can be applied equally to them. 
Axiomatic truth theories consist of axioms for truth formulated over a 
base theory that contains a sufficient amount of syntax to provide the 
specific objects we will ascribe truth to, the truth-bearers, which, as is 
customary, we take to be sentences—or numbers that code sentences.1 
Let L be a first-order language, the language of the base theory, and 
let L T extend L with a monadic predicate T, for truth. We assume L 
contains enough vocabulary to express certain syntactic properties, rela­
tions, and functions of expressions of L T to be specified, and a quote 
name φ for each formula φ of L T. Let Σ, the base theory, be a recursively 
axiomatised system formulated in L T containing a syntax theory for L T 
itself, which we assume is strong enough to relatively interpret first-order 
Peano arithmetic. For simplicity, we assume L has a term for every 
object in the domain of its intended interpretation and that Σ proves 
this, although all of our claims can be easily generalised if a satisfaction 
predicate is adopted instead. We also assume that only logical or syntac­
tic principles containing T are derivable in Σ, but no truth principles. An 
axiomatic truth system Γ is then a recursive extension of Σ with axioms 
governing T. 
What formal theories of truth can and should deflationists endorse? 
What truth axioms can and should a theory Γ consist of? The orthodoxy 
dictates that Γ should extend the base theory Σ only with a transparency 
_ _ 
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principle. These are given by instances of so-called principles of (local) 
disquotation, that is, either the following schema: 
T⌜φ⌝$ φ ðT-schemaÞ 
or the inference rules 
φ ‘ T⌜φ⌝ ðT-IntroÞ 
T⌜φ⌝‘ φ ðT-ElimÞ 
possibly restricted to a class Δ of sentences of L T, which may but need 
not necessarily coincide with L T. 
Some philosophers have claimed that the deflationist’s truth axioms 
should consist of all instances of disquotation for sentences of L T, 
including those that contain the truth predicate. Due to the semantic 
paradoxes, this would preclude the use of classical logic and force 
the adoption of weaker systems instead, adding yet another entry to 
the long list of restrictions imposed on deflationary theories. In 
Picollo and Schindler (2018b) we have given some reasons for believing 
that this restriction cuts too deep. We will not rehearse these arguments 
here, but simply assume that deflationists can adhere to classical logic. 
Horwich, one of the most vocal deflationists, clearly shares our view on 
this matter. 
As anticipated in the introduction, it is usually maintained that compo­
sitional truth theories should be excluded from the deflationary picture. 
These theories get their name from their axioms, some of which are 
not instances of disquotation but compositional principles, such as 
8x8y ðSentDðxÞ ^ SentDðyÞ ^ SentDðx^yÞ ! ðTx^y $ Tx ^ TyÞÞ ðT^↾DÞ 
where SentΔ(x) is a predicate that holds only of sentences in Δ and ^ is a 
_ 
symbol for the function that maps every pair of formulae of L T to their 
conjunction (and similarly for the other logical connectives). T^↾Δ states 
that if x, y, and their conjunction belong to Δ, then the conjunction is true 
just in case both conjuncts are. Similar principles can be given for the 
other logical connectives and the quantifiers. 
The orthodox view also maintains that no Tarskian truth theory shall 
be endorsed by a deflationist. These theories extend Σ with an axiom of 
the form 
8x ðTx $ FðxÞÞ ðT↾DÞ 
where Φ(x) holds only of sentences in Δ and T occurs in Φ(x) only 
applied to expressions of less complexity than x—sometimes considered 
to be a recursive (or explicit, if T doesn’t occur in Φ at all) definition of 
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T. We will occasionally refer to principles of the form T↾Δ as ‘Tarskian 
principles’, or, if intended as definitions, as ‘Tarskian definitions’. 
Next we will consider and discuss a series or arguments in favour of 
the orthodoxy, and show that, at best, they have limited reach. 
3.3 Arguments for the Incompatibility Thesis 
In this section we will rehearse six arguments that have been given in 
favour of the incompatibility thesis. 
ARGUMENT 1. A reason often given for restricting the deflationist’s truth 
axioms to locally disquotational principles—of which Horwich (1998) is 
perhaps the most vocal promoter but many others have echoed him— 
stems from the equivalence thesis. According to the latter, the only 
basic facts about truth from a deflationist viewpoint are instances of trans­
parency; they are “the whole truth about truth” (Stoljar and Damnjano­
vic, 2014). Thus, many have concluded, the axioms of a deflationary 
formal truth theory should consist exclusively of these basic principles, 
and every other fact about truth should be explained by—i.e. follow 
from—them. In support of this conclusion, consider the following 
remark by Horwich (2005): “the minimalist thesis is that the basic facts 
(i.e. the axioms of the theory that explains every other fact about truth) 
will all be instances of the [equivalence] schema” (p. 76). 
ARGUMENT 2. A related argument often wielded against compositional 
and Tarskian truth theories qua definitions is also based on the equiva­
lence thesis, which suggests that a definition of ‘true’ is neither necessary 
nor possible: 
For ‘true’ is a primitive term; so the only interesting account that can 
be given of its meaning is one that identifies which underlying prop­
erty of the word (i.e. which aspect of our use of it) is responsible for 
its possessing that meaning. In particular, our truth predicate means 
what it does . . . in virtue of our underived commitment to the equiv­
alence schema. 
(Horwich, 2005, pp. 75–76) 
Thus, even if extensionally adequate, compositional and Tarskian truth 
theories cannot provide real definitions of truth. 
ARGUMENT 3. Another argument commonly offered against the com­
patibility between deflationism and Tarskian truth theories stems from 
the logico-linguistic function thesis. If our truth predicate could be 
given by a Tarskian definition, then the language would already have 
the resources to formulate a predicate satisfying the relevant transpar­
ency principles. In this case, truth would be eliminable via the definiens, 
and thus the truth predicate would be dispensable. But according to the 
logico-linguistic function thesis, ‘true’ plays an indispensable role in 
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(theoretically informed) natural language. Thus, Halbach and Horsten 
(2005) write: “definable notions of truth are not of primary interest to 
the deflationist because they are always just notions of truth for at 
best a part of our ‘real’ language” (p. 204). 
ARGUMENT 4. Yet another reason given against compositional and 
Tarskian truth theories is that they only work for simple, formal lan­
guages. While Tarskian theories may be able to explain how the truth 
conditions of sentences of certain formal languages depend on the refer­
ents of their parts, it is not clear how they could deal with sentences of a 
natural language: “nobody has been able to show, for sentences involv­
ing ‘that’-clauses, probabilistic locutions, attributive adjectives, or mass 
terms, how their truth could be explained by as a consequence of the ref­
erents of their parts” (Horwich, 2005, p. 77). 
ARGUMENT 5. Following the line of thought of Argument 1, it has been 
argued that compositional and Tarskian truth theories are not available 
to the deflationist because they cannot be derived from what the defla­
tionist considers to be the basic facts about truth. A particularly forceful 
objection of this kind is due to Gupta (2000), and has generated much 
discussion in the literature. Of course, it was essentially for this reason 
that (Tarski, 1935, p. 257) rejected an axiomatisation of truth based 
purely on instances of T-schema. 
ARGUMENT 6. The sixth argument for the incompatibility thesis is an 
argument from substantiality. It has been claimed that compositional 
and Tarskian truth theories encapsulate substantial conceptions of 
truth because such theories are often non-conservative over their base 
theory, i.e. they allow us to prove claims in the language of the base 
theory that are not already provable in the base theory. In other 
words, Tarskian and compositional truth theories often allow us to 
gain more knowledge about the objects the base theory is about; thus, 
their truth predicate must be playing an explanatory role and, therefore, 
they must convey a substantial notion of truth. 
At first glance, these arguments look convincing. At any rate, it 
appears that they have been accepted by many opponents of deflation-
ism. Indeed, in light of the previous quotes by Horwich, one would 
think that (some) deflationists themselves have accepted the incompati­
bility thesis. However, there is a tension: there is a considerable 
amount of textual evidence that deflationists do in fact reject the incom­
patibility thesis. Field’s work is a clear example, as he systematically 
advocates truth theories that validate compositional principles,2 as 
does Horsten.3 Moreover, Field (1999) himself has offered a forceful 
response to Argument 6, defending compositional truth theories 
against the charge of substantiality. 
In addition, Horwich explicitly notes that the notions of truth, refer­
ence, and satisfaction actually do interact in the way indicated by 
Tarski, at least for certain fragments of English. He does not object to 
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Tarski’s theory on the ground that its axioms are incorrect. Rather,  he  
claims that these axioms “should not be treated as explanatorily basic, 
but should be explained in terms of simple, separate, minimal theories of 
truth, reference, and satisfaction” (Horwich, 1998, pp. 111–112). Similarly, 
Horwich explicitly endorses several compositional principles of truth, such 
as that a conjunction is true if and only if both conjuncts are true. Again, 
the reason that they do not feature among the axioms of his theory of 
truth is simply that he doesn’t consider them as explanatorily basic. 
In order to dissolve this tension and to show that the incompatibility 
thesis is incorrect, it will be helpful to have a closer look at the different 
purposes formal theories of truth can serve. 
3.4 What Is a Formal Truth Theory Good for? 
As many have pointed out, formal truth theories can serve various pur­
poses. Soames (1984), for instance, distinguishes between three things a 
truth theory can do. First, it can serve as a faithful account of the behav­
iour of our natural language truth predicate. Call this a ‘descriptive 
purpose’. As Soames points out, not many philosophers have attempted 
to provide a truth theory suited for descriptive purposes; rather, this is 
seen as the proper domain of linguistics. Philosophers, instead, have 
been mostly concerned with truth theories that put forward a new, 
precise, and consistent truth-like predicate intended as a replacement 
for our (possibly defective) natural language truth predicate. Soames 
gives the example of Tarskian truth theories as an illustration of theories 
of this kind. The third purpose he discusses involves cases where a notion 
of truth, taken to be antecedently understood, is deployed to explicate 
other related concepts such as meaning or knowledge or some general 
metaphysical view. A prominent example here is the use to which David-
son attempted to put Tarski-style truth theories in giving an account of 
natural language semantics. 
In addition to these three purposes that a truth theory can serve, 
we would like to propose a fourth, which should be very close to the 
deflationist’s heart. According to the deflationist’s logico-linguistic func­
tion thesis, the truth predicate serves a role akin to that of the logical 
connectives. If deflationism is right, the truth predicate—roughly like 
conjunction, the conditional, the universal quantifier, etc.—plays an im­
portant expressive or inferential role. For deflationists and other philoso­
phers who believe that truth plays such a role, it is only reasonable to 
want a formal truth theory capable of characterising the validity or cor­
rectness of inferences involving the notion of truth. As an analogy, it is 
helpful to compare the way in which, for instance, calculi for first-order 
logic play the role of characterising the validity or correctness of inferences 
involving negation, conjunction, quantifiers, etc. When a theory of truth 
plays this role, let us say that it serves a ‘logical purpose’.4 
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The language of a formal truth theory intended to serve a logical 
purpose should be extensive or extensible enough that we can formalise 
(most of) our arguments involving the truth predicate (and other logical 
terms), just as first-order languages do for their logical terms. The aim, 
then, is to provide a theory that diagnoses an argument (suitably formal­
ised and regimented) as valid just in case its premises entail the conclu­
sion against the background of the truth theory. 
In the remainder of this section we will argue that, while the first four 
arguments considered in the previous section have significant force when 
applied to formal truth theories intended to play a descriptive purpose, 
their force considerably diminishes when applied to formal theories 
intended to play a logical purpose instead. 
If one is working with a broadly descriptive goal in mind, it is natural 
to impose certain constraints on one’s formal truth theory Γ. Most signif­
icantly, it will be required that the truth-theoretic component of Γ closely 
reflects the actual usage or meaning of ‘true’. Of course, it is almost inev­
itable in practice that even a truth theory offered in a descriptive spirit 
will be idealised in various ways; but the point is that the main criterion 
of success is fidelity to established usage. Similarly, the theory should not 
lapse into oversimplification. As Argument 4 suggests, we should plausi­
bly expect that a descriptive theory Γ satisfactorily describes not only the 
behaviour of the truth predicate taken alone, but also within complex 
environments, e.g. within ‘that’-clauses, probabilistic locutions, environ­
ments containing attributive adjectives, mass terms, etc., as these 
constructions are prevalent in (even theoretically informed) natural 
language. 
Plausibly, given the emphasis that deflationism places on the equiva­
lence and the logico-linguistic function thesis, one’s deflationist commit­
ments will impose additional constraints on theories put forward to serve 
the descriptive project. One is that no real definition of truth is possible, 
as Argument 2 suggests. Another is that no descriptively adequate truth 
theory will put forward an even nominally definable and, therefore, elim­
inable truth predicate, as prescribed by Argument 3. Finally, given the 
basic and exhaustive role the equivalence thesis ascribes to formal trans­
parency principles in governing our usage of ‘true’, deflationists are com­
mitted to the claim that a broadly descriptively adequate truth theory 
will consist of instances (perhaps within a restricted class of sentences) 
of local disquotation. In particular, as Argument 1 suggests, all other 
truth-theoretic principles must then be derived from those instances; 
there seems to be no room for compositional or Tarskian axioma­
tisations within the descriptive project, at least as carried out by 
deflationists. 
It is this line of reasoning, we believe, that lends a spurious plausibility 
to Arguments 1–4 in the previous section. To the extent that deflationists 
are attempting to offer an axiomatic truth theory capable of playing a 
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descriptive role, these arguments can be endorsed and the constraints 
they propose can be taken as genuine ones. However, we believe that 
the plausibility of these arguments diminishes substantially when 
applied to a truth theory intended to serve a logical purpose, as we 
will now explain. 
Assume we are attempting to formulate a formal theory of truth 
capable of serving a logical purpose. Naturally, the first thing we 
require is that the theory contains or entails principles governing the 
truth predicate sufficient to allow it to serve its logico-linguistic role. 
At first, it may seem as if a truth theory of this kind must satisfy the 
same conditions that deflationists impose on their descriptive truth the­
ories. After all, if a formal truth theory adequate for logical purposes 
were not also descriptively adequate, it is not clear how one could prop­
erly formalise natural language arguments involving the truth predicate. 
Moreover, if deflationism is right about the role of the (theoretically 
informed) natural language truth predicate, it seems that the truth pred­
icate of a theory that is faithful to our usage should also be capable of 
serving that role. 
However compelling these points may seem, we will argue that they 
do not adequately take into account the fact that simplification and idea­
lisation are considerably more admissible in a theory intended for logical 
purposes than in a purportedly descriptive account. Moreover, for theo­
ries serving a logical purpose, it is less important to be faithful to the 
precise way that the meaning of the truth predicate is fixed in English. 
To make this point clear, we turn once again to the analogy with first-
order languages and calculi. 
Note first that first-order languages do not admit indexicals, ‘that’­
clauses, probabilistic locutions, attributive adjectives, mass terms, etc.; 
they work, as it were, with eternal or context-independent sentences 
only. For instance, if one wishes to formalise an English argument in a 
first-order language, one first needs to replace all indexicals with names 
referring to their referents (in the context of utterance) and make corre­
sponding amendments. Arguably, this is a small price to pay for perspicu­
ity and elegance, which is evidenced by how widely first-order logic is 
deployed in the analysis of the validity of arguments. It would seem 
equally reasonable for us to pay this price in the case of a formal truth 
theory we wish to adopt for logical purposes. Pace Argument 4, a 
theory of truth (be it a deflationary one or not) should not be expected 
to account for the interaction between truth and indexicals, ‘that’-clauses, 
and other natural language oddities. Simplification and idealisation 
are permissible to a larger degree if one’s purpose is not fundamentally 
descriptive. 
Second, note that for logical purposes, whether the axioms of our 
theory coincide with the most basic principles governing our usage of 
the truth predicate in natural language does not matter. Adverting 
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again to the analogy with logical constants, note that natural language 
usage is often ignored, just as e.g. Hilbert-style or sequent calculi for 
first-order logic make no pretence of capturing the most psychologically 
basic patterns of inference in their basic axioms and rules. All that 
matters is that, taken together, they provide us with an adequate 
account of validity for arguments involving truth (modulo simplification, 
and idealisation). Thus, whilst Arguments 1 and 2 might be compelling 
when considering formal truth theories intended for descriptive purposes, 
they aren’t so when we want our theories for logical purposes instead. 
Finally, if we are interested in making inferences involving only certain 
expressions, it would seem permissible to restrict our logical or truth-
theoretic principles in such a way that our logical terms or truth 
predicate interacts exclusively with the relevant class of expressions. 
Of course, as an account of validity for a more encompassing class of 
expressions, the resulting theories will not be satisfactory; their use 
would be limited. In the case of truth, this could amount, for instance, 
to restricting the sound instances of disquotation (whichever these are) 
to a proper subclass. As a result, the truth predicate of the theory could 
turn out to be nominally definable. However, this does not conflict with 
the fundamental tenets of deflationism, as Argument 3 suggests, provided 
that the truth predicate of certain extended truth theories is not definable. 
It is compatible with the indefinability of our natural language truth pred­
icate that when transparency is restricted to a subclass of expressions in 
our formal theories, the resulting predicate admits a nominal definition. 
Despite the fact that Arguments 1–4 of the previous section fail to 
apply to truth theories intended for a logical purpose, theories of this 
kind should nevertheless still be expected to satisfy certain other condi­
tions. We would like to mention two fundamental requirements: the 
functionality criterion and the insubstantiality criterion.5 
The functionality criterion, indicated a few paragraphs above, 
demands that the axioms of the theory allow the truth predicate to 
perform the logico-linguistic function of truth—at least to a reasonable 
extent. Of course, which axioms are sufficient to achieve this goal 
depends entirely on the precise nature of the logico-linguistic function 
of truth, so an account of the latter is needed. We have developed 
such an account in Picollo and Schindler (2018a). In Section 3.5 we 
briefly review it and extract a precise criterion of functionality from it. 
The insubstantiality criterion demands that truth theories do not convey 
a non-deflationary notion of truth, i.e. they should not entail that truth is a 
substantial property. What counts as a substantial truth property is natu­
rally a very controversial issue which we are not able to resolve here. 
However, in Section 3.6 we will argue that if one starts with a truth 
theory that is taken to be insubstantial, then adding certain principles 
which, in a sense to be explained, follow from the axioms of the theory 
does not render the relevant notion of truth substantial. 
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Taken together, these criteria will allow us to recognise certain compo­
sitional and Tarskian theories as being deflationary, and hence to refute 
the two remaining arguments—Arguments 5 (cf. Section 3.6) and 6 (cf. 
Section 3.7). Consequently, we will argue that the thesis that composi­
tional and Tarskian theories are necessarily committed to a substantial 
notion of truth can be put to rest, at least for now (cf. Section 3.8). 
3.5 The Functionality Criterion 
Our first criterion on an axiomatisation of truth intended for logical pur­
poses is that such a theory must enable the truth predicate to fulfil its 
logico-linguistic role. In the present section, we will provide a precise for­
mulation of this criterion. 
It is striking that the purported logico-linguistic function the truth pred­
icate is supposed to play has rarely been the subject of study in the liter­
ature, even by logicians or deflationists. One of the few articles providing 
a positive and formally precise account of the function is Halbach (1999). 
In Picollo and Schindler (2018b) we discussed this account and others that 
are hinted at in the literature, and argued they are unsuccessful; in Picollo 
and Schindler (2018a) we put forward our own positive account. Inspired 
by a tradition that originated in Ramsey, and to which Quine, Grover, and 
Azzouni, among others also belong,6 we argued that the function defla­
tionism ascribes to the truth predicate is best understood as enabling us 
to simulate sentential and predicate quantification within a first-order 
framework. In other words, the truth predicate lets us quantify into sen­
tence and predicate position in an indirect way, i.e. without introducing 
sentential or predicate quantifiers. In still other words, the truth predicate 
and sentential and predicate quantifiers serve the same purpose. 
For instance, to assert all theorems of first-order Peano arithmetic one 
could work with a monadic operator □ expressing provability in this 
theory plus sentential quantifiers, and write 8α (□α ! α). Alternatively, 
one could use a provability predicate Prov(x) and a truth predicate, and 
assert 8x ðProvðxÞ ! TxÞ. Similarly, one can generalise on φ(t) _ ¬φ(t) 
using second-order quantifiers, as in 8X(Xt _ ¬Xt), or one can turn to 
the truth predicate and say 
8x ðForm1ðxÞ ! ðTxð⌜t⌝Þ _ :Txð⌜t⌝ÞÞÞ 
where Form1(x) expresses the property of being a formula with only one 
free variable and x(y) is the result of substituting in x the free variable 
with the term denoted by y. 
In order to explain and substantiate our claims, in Picollo and Schin­
dler (2018a) we have offered a series of formal results that establish that 
every theory in a language with sentential or predicate quantifiers— 
second- or higher-order, predicative or impredicative—can be ‘naturally 
reformulated’ in a language containing a purely disquotational truth 
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predicate instead.7 We first indicated how to translate every formula of a 
higher-order language into a first-order language with a truth predicate 
in a natural and effective way, i.e. along the lines of our examples in the 
previous paragraph. Instances of sentential comprehension—be they 
predicative or impredicative—translate into instances of local disquota­
tion, provided the comprehension instances contain no free sentential 
variables, and into instances of uniform disquotation otherwise. On 
the other hand, instances of predicate comprehension always require 
uniform disquotation. The latter is a principle that generalises local dis-
quotation to formulae with free variables. For instance, the following 
does so for formulae with one free variable: 
8t ðT⌜φðtÞ⌝$ φðt.ÞÞ ðUniform T-schemaÞ 
_ 
Here, 8tψ abbreviates 8v (ClTerm(v) ! ψ) for a suitable variable v, 
where ClTerm(v) expresses the property of being a closed term; ⌜φðtÞ⌝ 
denotes the result of substituting t for the free variable in φ, and 
_ 
t. 
denotes the value of the term t. 
We then proved that the proposed translation is a relative interpreta­
tion of the higher-order calculus into a—classical and consistent— 
disquotational truth theory, as it maps every higher-order derivation 
into a derivation in the truth theory that extends first-order classical 
logic with a suitable syntax theory and all instances of the (Uniform) T-
schema for formulae in the range of our translation. This result is novel 
in so far as it establishes that (uniform) disquotation can even interpret 
full impredicative predicate comprehension, i.e. principles of the form 
9X 8v ðXv $ φÞ 
where φ itself may contain bound predicate variables. It shows that the 
proof-theoretic power of truth is much greater than previously thought. 
Moreover, we also showed that all inferences between translations that 
can be carried out in this truth theory are derivable in the calculus for 
higher-order logic. 
Sentential and predicate quantifiers allow us to directly generalise over 
all sentences and formulae in the higher-order language. The truth predi­
cate, we concluded, can bring about the same logical power: if (uniform) 
disquotation for translations of higher-order formulae is available, we can 
simulate quantification over the latter using their translations as proxies. 
More generally, one can use a truth predicate to simulate sentential and 
predicate quantification over a given class of expressions as long as 
the instances of disquotation for the expressions in this class—or their 
translations—are available. Our account of the function of truth confirms 
the common but rarely substantiated claim that (uniform) disquotation is 
both sufficient and necessary for the truth predicate to fulfil its role. 
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As a consequence, local disquotation for the class of sentences we 
wish to generalise over is desirable in our truth systems, and uniform 
disquotation even more so, especially if we wish to generalise into pred­
icate position. In general, we would like to put forward the following 
adequacy criterion for formal truth theories intended for logical 
purposes: 
Functionality A formal theory of truth intended for logical purposes 
should entail all instances of (uniform) disquotation for the class of 
expressions one wishes to generalise over. 
Note that this criterion implies that generalising over the whole class of 
expressions of the language of the theory itself is not possible if classical 
logic is assumed in the background. For that would require that all 
instances of disquotation for sentences containing the truth predicate 
are derived, and triviality would follow. If one wishes to generalise 
unrestrictedly over all expressions of the language, one should probably 
look into non-classical truth theories instead. However, this might turn 
out to be not as straightforward as it seems. It is not entirely clear to 
us what inferences the truth predicate should validate in that case, as 
our results only establish the relative interpretability of classical higher-
order theories in a disquotational truth theory. On the one hand, classical 
higher-order theories seem to be too strong to be relatively interpretable 
in a non-classical truth theory. On the other hand, very little is known 
about non-classical systems of higher-order quantification. In any case, 
the general lesson of our discussion should be clear: one first needs to 
determine what axioms and rules for truth are needed in a particular 
logic for it to fulfil its logico-linguistic function, and then derive a crite­
rion of functionality from that. 
3.6 The Insubstantiality Criterion 
In the previous section we formulated a criterion of functionality that 
any formal truth theory intended for logical purposes ought to satisfy. 
However, not any such theory will do—for example, inconsistent or 
trivial theories are excluded, as they would obviously fail to adequately 
characterise the validity or correctness of inferences involving the notion 
of truth. Moreover, as we anticipated towards the end of Section 3.4, 
truth theories that can be legitimately endorsed by deflationists for 
logical purposes should also satisfy the insubstantiality criterion: they 
must not encapsulate a substantial notion of truth. 
What encapsulating a substantial notion of truth amounts to is of 
course a matter of controversy, and we will not engage with the general 
metaphysical question of what a substantial property is. Instead, we will 
show that if one starts with an insubstantial theory, then the addition 
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of certain compositional and Tarskian principles will not inflate that 
notion of truth. This will be the case, for instance, if the latter principles 
generalise on a schematic consequence of the starting theory. Again, we 
will not say much about what constitutes an insubstantial theory of 
truth. However, if deflationism is correct, then there must be at least one 
such theory—e.g. the theory consisting of all correct instances of disquota­
tion. The purpose of this section is to show that if one starts from such an 
insubstantial and restricted truth theory, then adding certain compositional 
or Tarskian principles will not lead to an inflated notion of truth. 
Despite its aspirations for generality, the T-schema cannot be stated 
by a single, universally quantified claim of the form 8x ðTx $ . . .Þ, as  
each instance has a sentence φ occurring inside quotes on the left-hand 
side and outside them on the right-hand side. The fact that each φ is 
both used and mentioned in its corresponding instance of the T-
schema precludes a straightforward generalisation of the disquotational 
principle. 
However, there are salient schematic principles that follow from the T-
schema together with background syntactic assumptions, and which can 
easily be generalised. A simple warm-up example is given by the Uniform 
T-schema, which we already discussed in the previous section. Let Δ be 
the class of sentences for which an instance of local disquotation is avail­
able. Assume that, for some formula φ(x), the sentence φ(t) is in  Δ for 
every closed term t. Thus, all the instances of the following are available: 
T⌜φðtÞ⌝ $ φðtÞ 
Then it is easily seen that the relevant instance of uniform disquota­
tion, i.e. 
8t ðT⌜φðt:Þ⌝ $ φðt.ÞÞ 
is a straightforward generalisation of the schematic principle. 
Let us look at another example. Consider the set of sentences such that 
both they and their negations are in Δ. Then, for each such sentence φ we 
can prove: 
T :⌜φ⌝$ :T⌜φ⌝ 
_ 
Since ⌜φ⌝ is a singular term, we can generalise on this principle as 
follows: 
8x ðSentDðxÞ ^ SentDð:: xÞ ! ðT :: x $ :TxÞÞ ðT:↾DÞ 
Analogously, all the instances of the following principle (where φ, ψ, and 
φ ^ ψ are in Δ) follow from the T-schema as well: 
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Replacing all occurrences of ⌜φ⌝ with x and those of ⌜ψ⌝ with y we can 
generalise on this schema by the following: 
8x8y ðSentDðxÞ ^ SentDðyÞ ^ SentDðx^ yÞ ! ðTx ^ y $ Tx ^ TyÞÞ ðT ↾̂DÞ 
Analogous principles for the other propositional connectives can 
be obtained likewise. Similarly, compositional principles for the quanti­
fiers can be seen as generalisations of schematic consequences of local 
disquotation.8 
Provided that Δ is a T-free sublanguage of L T (i.e. Δ is closed under 
logical predicates and operators) containing finitely many predicate 
symbols, one can also generalise on the T-schema by means of a 
so-called Tarskian definition, T↾Δ. For instance, if all closed terms of 
L T occur in formulae in Δ, identity is the only predicate symbol, and 
¬, ^, and 8 are the only logical operators occurring in formulae in Δ, 
the following principle just ‘puts together’ the instance of uniform dis-
quotation for the identity predicate and the compositional principles 
for the logical terms: 
.8x ðTx $ SentDðxÞ ^ ð9s9t ðx ¼ ðs ¼ tÞ ^ s. ¼ t Þ _  
_ 
9y ðx ¼ :y ^ :TyÞ _  
_ 
9y9z ðx ¼ y^ z ^ Ty ^ TzÞ _  
_ 
9y9z ðx ¼ 8 y z ^ 8t ðTzðtÞÞÞÞ 
We have seen how uniform disquotation, as well as compositional and 
Tarskian principles, can be ‘extracted’ from the T-schema by generalising 
on certain schematic principles that follow from it. They are general prin­
ciples all of whose instances are already entailed by the latter. Arguably, 
these principles just provide more general ways of presenting the T-
schema itself or some of its schematic consequences. If this is on the 
right track, then it is hard to see why they should be more substantial 
than the principles we started with. In this context, it is interesting to 
note that the way in which uniform disquotation generalises on local dis-
quotation is not too different from the way the compositional principles 
do, so it is surprising that nobody has disputed the suitability of uniform 
disquotation as a deflationary truth principle. As we see things, if uniform 
disquotation is acceptable, then so are compositional principles. 
There is one obvious worry regarding our reasoning above. Composi­
tional, Tarskian, and uniform disquotation principles don’t follow 
logically from their corresponding instances, but are usually (proof­
theoretically) stronger than them, due to the compactness of the logical 
consequence relation. The possibility that this additional content inflates 
_ _ 
_ _ 
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the notion hasn’t been completely ruled out, despite the fact that these 
principles merely generalise schematic consequences of local disquotation. 
Horwich’s method for dealing with this objection is well known. Non-
basic facts about truth need to be explained in terms of transparency 
principles together with further explanatory factors, i.e. principles that 
have nothing specifically to do with the truth predicate (cf. Horwich, 
1998, p. 24; Horwich, 2005). We believe this strategy is essentially 
sound. Horwich himself appears to appeal to some form of ω-rule as 
an additional principle, which has provoked some criticism due to its 
infinitary character (cf. Raatikainen, 2005). Fortunately, there are 
other suitable principles. We will first describe what these principles 
are, and then discuss whether they are available to the deflationist. 
We can bridge the gap between generalisations such as compositional, 
Tarskian, and uniform disquotation principles and their instances by 
informing the truth theory we are working with that, whenever it sche­
matically proves all instances of a certain formula, the inference to the 
general claim that all instances of this formula hold is permissible (see 
Halbach, 2001a and Horsten and Leigh, 2017 for some formal 
results). Let ProvΓ(x) express in L that x is a theorem of the formal 
theory Γ. Our gap-bridging principles take then the following form: 
8t ProvGð⌜φðtÞ⌝Þ ! 8t φðt.Þ ðGBPðGÞÞ 
_ 
Principles of this kind—not provable in Γ for familiar Gödelian reasons— 
allow us to formalise the ‘extraction’ of a general claim from its instances 
into a proper derivation. For example, let Γ extend the base theory Σ with 
all instances of local disquotation for sentences in Δ. Since  Γ schematically 
derives all instances of 
SentDðtÞ ^ SentDð: tÞ ! ðT : t $ :TtÞ 
for every closed term t, adding GBP(Γ) to  Γ delivers 
8t ðSentDðt.Þ ^ SentDð: t.Þ ! ðT : t. $ :Tt.ÞÞ 
which, together with the fact—provable in Σ—that each sentence in Δ is 
denoted by a term in the language, entails the compositional principle 
T¬↾Δ. Applying a similar reasoning, we can derive the Uniform T-
schema and compositional principles restricted to Δ for the other proposi­
tional connectives in Γ extended with GBP(Γ). Finally, compositional 








A similar argument can be given in the case of so-called Tarskian 
definitions, T↾D. Let Γ be as before. If, additionally, Δ is a T-free sublan­
guage of L T as before, then T↾D follows in Γ from uniform disquotation 
_ _ 
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and the compositional principles for all logical terms, both restricted to 
Δ, plus the following: 
8x ðTx ! SentDðxÞÞ ðb↾DÞ 
Thus, T↾D follows in Γ from (iterated applications of) GBP(Γ) together 
with β↾Δ, which states that only sentences in Δ can be true. 
Does GBP(Γ) qualify as a suitable additional principle that the defla­
tionist can employ in explaining certain facts about truth? Suppose we 
work with classical logic, as Horwich does, and assume for a moment 
that we firmly endorse the deflationary acceptable truth theory Γ: 
when I learn that some sentence is provable in Γ, I have good reasons 
to believe it. Now let φ(x) be a formula of L T and consider the following 
instance of excluded middle: 
ð8t ProvGð⌜φðtÞ⌝Þ ! 8t φðt.ÞÞ _ : ð8t ProvGð⌜φðtÞ⌝Þ ! 8t φðt.ÞÞ 
Which of the two disjuncts should we endorse? Consider the second dis­
junct. Accepting it commits us to the claim that although φ(t) is provable 
in Γ for every closed term t, nonetheless there is a closed term t such that 
¬φ(t). This entails that we should not accept some consequences of Γ! Since  
we firmly endorse Γ, we should reject the second disjunct, and therefore 
accept the first disjunct. But the latter is just an instance of GBP(Γ). 
Let us clarify one point, before dealing with some objections. Given an 
instance of excluded middle, one can in general remain agnostic about 
which disjunct obtains. For example, a classical set theorist is committed 
to the claim that either the continuum hypothesis or its negation holds, 
but she may remain agnostic about which disjunct holds barring new evi­
dence. However, the present case is different. The second disjunct entails 
that some consequences of Γ don’t hold. Thus, if you firmly endorse Γ, 
you ought to reject it and accept the first disjunct, even if the statement 
is independent of Γ. Anything else would be incoherent. But now, once 
you have accepted GBP(Γ) as an additional (non-truth-theoretic) princi­
ple, other truth-theoretic principles follow. 
We cannot see any good reason why the truth-theoretic principles that 
follow from adding GBP(Γ) to our truth theory Γ should inflate the 
notion of truth. We have assumed that the truth-theoretic principles of 
Γ are insubstantial. In arguing for GBP(Γ), we have not appealed to 
the notion of truth, let alone a substantial notion of truth. Moreover, 
GBP(Γ) itself isn’t formulated in terms of truth. In what follows, we 
anticipate three possible objections. 
OBJECTION 1. The argument assumes that ProvΓ(x) ‘expresses’ the 
property of being provable in Γ. The standard explanation of why it 
does so involves the notion of truth in the standard model of the base 
theory Σ—e.g. the standard model of arithmetic. However, the latter is 
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not admissible to a deflationist, because on their account truth is charac­
terised through transparency. 
Our reply to this objection is essentially identical to that given by Cie­
śliń ski (2017, p. 153). Very roughly, ProvΓ(x) ‘expresses’ the property 
of being provable in Γ because the way the predicate is defined structur­
ally resembles the way how ‘provable in Γ’ is defined in the metalan­
guage of Γ. We find this response especially plausible in this context 
because deflationists usually rely on a use theory of meaning—rather 
than on truth-conditional semantics—according to which the meaning 
of ‘provable in Γ’ must be given through some rules for using that 
expression. 
OBJECTION 2. GBP(Γ) is a schematic principle, and according to defla­
tionists the sole purpose of the truth predicate is to generalise sentence 
places in our language. Thus, we ought to formulate GBP(Γ) as a single 
statement deploying the truth predicate. But then it becomes apparent 
that our additional principle is of a truth-theoretic nature after all. 
We do not find this objection very convincing. First, it is not gener­
ally the case that whenever we generalise a schema using the truth pred­
icate the resulting statement is a truth-theoretic statement. The claim 
that everything the Pope said is true or that all theorems of arithmetic 
are true is not a truth-theoretic statement, although it involves the 
notion of truth. According to the logico-linguistic function thesis (the 
second core tenet of deflationism), such generalisations do little more 
than express all papal assertions or all theorems of arithmetic in a 
compact way. 
Second, even if the truth predicate allows us to express the schema in a 
single statement, we are certainly not obliged to do so. At any rate, it is 
hard to see how the fact that we can derive compositional principles of 
truth using GBP(Γ)—which is not stated in terms of truth—could be 
undermined by the fact that we can generalise GBP(Γ) using the notion 
of truth. 
Third, we know that due to the paradoxes it is not possible to gener­
alise over all sentence places in our language (at least as long as we 
adhere to classical logic). We can only do so for a restricted class of sen­
tences. But GBP(Γ) is a schema that ranges over all sentences. Thus it is 
not even clear that we can generalise GBP(Γ) using the notion of truth. (It 
might be thought that all this shows is that the deflationary account of 
truth is incompatible with the use of classical logic. We have argued in 
Picollo and Schindler (2018b) that this is not the case.) 
OBJECTION 3. GBP(Γ) is unacceptable because it is inconsistent with 
certain unrestricted compositional axioms for truth. 
We are not particularly worried by this objection either. On our view, 
deflationists ought to reject unrestricted compositional axioms for truth 
on quite independent grounds already, so their inconsistency with GBP 
(Γ) cannot cast doubt on the latter. Very roughly, the reason why 
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deflationists ought to reject unrestricted compositional axioms for truth 
is precisely because not all of their instances are generally entailed by 
restricted disquotational principles of truth. If only instances of disquo­
tation for a given class of expressions Δ are available, it is hard to see 
how compositional or Tarskian principles whose instances go beyond 
Δ can be justified on the basis of the original theory, even if additional 
non-truth-theoretic principles are invoked.9 We return to this point in 
Section 3.8, at the end of the chapter. 
Our preceding argument for GBP(Γ) relies on the law of excluded 
middle and so might not be available to all deflationists. It is difficult 
to say something in general here, as the matter will depend on the 
details of the non-classical system. At any rate, since our goal is 
merely to show that deflationism is compatible with compositional 
and Tarskian truth theories, it is sufficient if we can make our point in 
the case where the deflationist account is based on classical logic. 
To sum up, we maintain that the addition of certain compositional, 
Tarskian, and uniform disquotation principles does not thicken the 
notion of truth conveyed by a deflationary adequate truth theory. 
First, we pointed out that certain compositional principles and Tarskian 
definitions are mere generalisations of schematic consequences of a class 
of instances of local disquotation, so it is hard to see how they could 
possibly inflate the notion of truth. We then pointed at the existence, 
under certain given conditions, of derivations of the more general prin­
ciples from local disquotation plus other non-truth theoretic claims 
deflationists may reasonably endorse. (Of course, if such proofs are 
not available—which will largely depend on the restrictions imposed 
on local disquotation and the background logic—there is no guarantee 
of the legitimacy of the general principles.) This motivates the following 
criterion: 
Relative Insubstantiality The (truth-theoretic) axioms of a formal truth 
theory are insubstantial if they are derivable in an insubstantial locally 
disquotational theory of truth together with additional non-truth­
theoretic principles a deflationist may reasonably endorse. 
The qualification ‘derivable in an insubstantial locally disquotational 
theory etc.’ is important: not every class of instances of local disquota­
tion is necessarily insubstantial. For example the class that comprises 
all the instances, being inconsistent, entails every truth principle whatso­
ever, even those one would readily call inflationary, e.g. that truth is cor­
respondence with fact (if expressible in the language). Other consistent 
subsets of this class will also be inadmissible for similar reasons, for 
although they will not entail every sentence of the language, some of 
them will entail substantial claims about truth, as will be seen in 
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Section 3.8. As we have said before, we won’t offer a definition of what 
constitutes an insubstantial disquotational theory of truth, but if defla­
tionism is correct, such theories do exist—the theory consisting of all 
correct instances of disquotation being one of them. 
3.7 The Argument From Conservativeness 
There is one objection that one could mount against our criterion of 
insubstantiality. This is the argument from conservativeness, mentioned 
in Section 3.3, namely, Argument 6. We will now deal with this objection. 
The equivalence thesis commits deflationism to the idea that any 
attempt to uncover the nature of truth beyond disquotation, the quest 
for a real definition of truth in terms of simpler notions is futile. Accord­
ing to deflationism, truth cannot be defined or further analysed; it is a sui 
generis property, if a property at all. This is often expressed by saying 
that truth has no nature, is metaphysically thin, or is otherwise insub­
stantial, but of course these are just metaphors. Many, however, have 
taken them to be a—and even the—defining feature of deflationism. 
Moreover, some understand the insubstantiality of truth to entail that 
truth cannot have any explanatory power. Shapiro (1998), for instance, 
claims that “[i]f truth/satisfaction is not substantial—as the deflationist 
contends—then we should not need to invoke truth in order to establish 
any results not involving truth explicitly” (p. 497). Formally, this trans­
lates in a natural way into what is known as the ‘conservativeness 
requirement’: deflationary truth theories should be conservative over 
their respective base theories—which should contain some amount of 
syntax (cf. Halbach, 2001b)—i.e. the addition of truth principles to a 
base theory should not allow us to prove new theorems in the language 
without the truth predicate. This requirement has been argued for by e.g. 
Horsten (1995), Shapiro (1998), and Ketland (1999). 
Another—related—road to conservativeness draws from the function 
deflationism assigns to truth. Its only purpose, as stated by the logico­
linguistic function thesis, is a logico-linguistic one. Thus, it has been 
argued, there is no room for an explanatory role of truth within defla­
tionism. In Horwich’s words: 
A deflationist attitude toward truth is inconsistent with the usual 
view of it as a deep and vital element of philosophical theory. Con­
sequently the many philosophers who are inclined to give the notion 
of truth a central role in their reflections in metaphysical, epistemo­
logical, and semantic problems must reject the minimalist account of 
its function. Conversely, those who sympathize with deflationary 
ideas about truth will not wish to place much theoretical weight 
on it. They will maintain that philosophy may employ the notion 
only in its minimalist capacity—that is, as something enabling the 
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formulation of certain generalizations—and that theoretical prob­
lems must be resolved without it. 
(Horwich, 1998, p. 52) 
Again, if deflationary truth must not play a role in the resolution of theoret­
ical issues, then the conservativeness requirement follows (or so it argued). 
Most compositional theories of truth on the market are, however, not 
conservative over their respective base theory (cf. Halbach, 2014; 
Horsten, 2011). Thus, if the conservativeness requirement is right, 
these theories are not deflationary. But also many untyped disquota­
tional theories aren’t conservative over their base theory either, some 
of which seem fairly attractive from a deflationary perspective, as the 
restriction they impose on the instances of disquotation can be justified 
from a philosophical point of view (cf. Picollo, 2019, for instance). 
On our view, however, the conservativeness requirement not only does 
not follow from the core theses of deflationism outlined in the introduc­
tion of this chapter but also is not a reasonable requirement to be 
imposed on deflationary truth theories. Indeed, we claim that the conser­
vativeness requirement is the result of (a) inferring too much from the 
metaphor of insubstantiality and (b) failing to see what the function of 
truth really amounts to. The analysis of this function, briefly sketched 
in Section 3.5, actually points (in many cases) in the opposite direction. 
Let us focus briefly on sentential and predicate quantifiers. While their 
role—whether logical or quasi-logical, we would not like to enter this 
dispute here—is merely expressive, their addition to a first-order base 
theory does not always yield a conservative extension. Now, in Picollo 
and Schindler (2018a) we’ve argued that the logico-liguistic function 
deflationism ascribes to the truth predicate is best understood as enabling 
us to simulate sentential and predicate quantification in a first-order 
setting, as mentioned in Section 3.5. In other words, from a deflationist per­
spective, the truth predicate—together with the first-order quantifiers—has 
the same function as sentential and predicate quantifiers. As a conse­
quence, we should not expect a formal truth theory well suited for func­
tional purposes to conservatively extend its base theory either. On the 
contrary, non-conservativeness is just a feature of the truth predicate ful­
filling its role. The conservativeness requirement cannot stem from the 
logico-linguistic function thesis; a ‘mere’ expressive role is compatible 
with the violation of conservativeness. 
Can the equivalence thesis support an argument for conservativeness? 
If so, it would be devastating for deflationism: while one of its core 
theses would point to conservative theories, the other points in the oppo­
site direction. Are the two fundamental theses of deflationism incompat­
ible with each other? We believe this is not the case. If we look closely at 
the equivalence thesis, there is good reason to believe that the insubstan­
tiality metaphor is just meant to indicate that the truth predicate, unlike 
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other predicates, does not play a descriptive role in our language; truth 
ascriptions are not descriptions of the truth-bearers involved. To quote 
Frege (1956), “nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it 
the property of truth” (p. 293), so the latter is not an ordinary or sub­
stantial property. As such, truth cannot play the explanatory role ordi­
nary properties play, i.e. to highlight an aspect of the object of study 
that would explain some of the characteristics of this object. But this 
doesn’t exclude the possibility that the truth predicate plays an explana­
tory role of a different kind, i.e. in proofs. Indeed, sentential and predi­
cate quantifiers can lead to new knowledge as well and therefore have 
explanatory value (assuming that proofs can have explanatory value), 
without being in any way descriptive. Their explanatory value derives 
solely from their role as a logico-linguistic device; the fact that they 
have explanatory value does not indicate in any way that they are ‘sub­
stantial’. Since the truth predicate plays the same function as these quan­
tifiers, similar considerations apply to it. Thus, we echo Field (1999) 
when he says that “any use of ‘true’ in explanations which derives 
solely from its role as a device of generalization should be perfectly 
acceptable” (p. 537). 
We therefore conclude that the conservativeness requirement should 
be given up; it cannot be used as an argument against the admissibility 
of certain truth-theoretic axioms for deflationism. 
3.8 Revisiting the Incompatibility Thesis 
It is time to take stock. We have looked at a number of arguments for the 
incompatibility of deflationism, on the one hand, and compositional and 
Tarskian truth theories, on the other. We have pointed out that 
the majority of these arguments ostensibly presuppose a particular 
purpose, i.e. to describe the basic usage of the truth predicate in 
natural language. This is a legitimate enterprise and we do not necessar­
ily disagree with some of the objections if judged against this purpose. 
However, we were quick to point out that the deflationist may want a 
formal theory of truth for a slightly different purpose, that is, to 
provide an account of the validity or correctness of arguments involving 
the truth predicate. 
We have formulated two constraints that any formal truth theory 
intended to serve a logical purpose ought to satisfy: functionality and 
insubstantiality. A formal truth theory intended for logical purposes 
should entail all instances of (uniform) disquotation for the class of 
expressions one wishes to generalise over and, moreover, its axioms 
should be insubstantial. Although we did not provide a general criterion 
of insubstantiality, we argued that a formal truth theory is insubstantial 
if its axioms are derivable in a locally disquotational truth theory which 
is itself insubstantial together with additional non-truth-theoretic 
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principles a deflationist may reasonably endorse. With these constraints 
at hand, let us now have a look at some of the classic formal truth the­
ories one can find in the literature and see whether they can be endorsed 
by a deflationist.10 
Let us start with what is probably the best-known and most simple 
formal truth theory: the theory that extends its base theory with all T-
free instances of the T-schema—usually known as TB, for ‘Tarski Bicon­
ditionals’. This theory satisfies our functionality criterion: if one merely 
wishes to quantify into sentence position over the class of T-free sen­
tences, TB will do. Moreover, it is widely believed to convey an insub­
stantial notion of truth. Based on this, the uniform version of TB, UTB 
(for ‘Uniform Tarski Biconditionals’), can also be seen to be deflationary 
because its axioms follow from TB together with additional non-truth­
theoretic principles an advocate of TB may reasonably endorse, e.g. 
GBP(TB). Since UTB entails all instances of uniform disquotation for 
T-free predicates, it improves on TB, as it also allows us to quantify 
into predicate position over this class of formulae. 
Similar considerations also apply to other locally disquotational theo­
ries: if the local theory is in good standing, so will be its uniform 
version. Note, however, that some locally disquotational theories might 
actually not be in good standing. This is obviously the case of the (classical) 
theory containing an instance of the T-schema for each sentence of L T, as  
it is inconsistent. But there are other purely disquotational theories that are 
consistent and yet violate some of our criteria. Assume φ expresses a sub­
stantial truth principle—e.g. that truth is essentially correspondence with 
the facts. Deploying a trick of McGee (1992), we know there is an instance 
of local disquotation that is provably equivalent (in the base theory) to φ. 
Hence, any theory containing that instance will be substantial. 
Let us now turn to compositional truth theories, i.e. systems in which 
instances of disquotation are only given for atomic expressions—or 
sometimes also negations of atomic expressions—whereas other truth 
axioms are compositional. As we have argued, the latter are admissible 
if they follow from Γ and suitable non-truth-theoretic principles. Such 
is the case of the axioms of CT, which extends the base theory with 
uniform disquotation for each primitive predicate in the T-free fragment 
of the language and compositional principles for the connectives and 
quantifiers, also restricted to sentences without T. CT is acceptable 
because it follows from GBP(UTB) (cf. Halbach, 2001a), which we 
already have seen to be acceptable. 
Still, one might wonder what the use of compositional theories like CT 
would be, given that they merely generalise on instances of disquotation, 
which are already sufficient for the function of truth. Since all these 
instances of disquotation are derivable in the compositional theory, 
there seems to be no reason not to endorse it. But are there any positive 
reasons? 
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There are at least two—intertwined—motives why compositional the­
ories could be preferable to corresponding disquotational systems. First, 
compositional principles allow us to reason more generally about truth. 
This can, in turn, provide us with simpler and shorter proofs (cf. Fischer, 
2014). Second, compositional principles can be used to provide us with a 
finite or more concise theory. If the T-free fragment of the language con­
tains finitely many primitive predicates, CT can be seen as a finite and 
more general way of “formulating” the truth-theoretic part of both TB 
and UTB. If there are infinitely many primitive predicates in the language 
instead, CT also contains infinitely many axioms, but is still more general 
and concise than its disquotational counterparts, as e.g. it doesn’t 
contain one instance of disquotation for each negated expression but 
all negations are dealt with by a single axiom in a general manner, 
and similarly for the other logical terms. 
For analogous reasons, Tarskian truth theories can be deflationary 
admissible for logical purposes and even preferable to local or uniform 
disquotational theories for the same class of expressions: they are more 
general and concise than the latter. Furthermore, since they have the 
form of a (recursive) definition, we know they do not introduce any incon­
sistencies to the base theory, which is clearly a theoretical advantage. 
This shows that the incompatibility thesis—i.e. that deflationism, on 
the one hand, and compositional and Tarskian theories, on the other, 
are not compatible—is mistaken after all. However, so far we have 
only given evidence of the admissibility of typed theories of truth. Let 
us therefore conclude the chapter by briefly surveying some untyped 
theories. 
Let us first consider the well-known system KF, Feferman’s axiomat­
isation of Kripke’s fixed-point theory of truth in classical logic. KF 
extends the base theory with uniform disquotation for atomic and nega­
tion of atomic formulae that don’t contain T, plus “positive” composi­
tional principles for every sentence of the language, including those 
containing T, and an axiom governing attributions of untruth. No 
axiom of the theory states that truth commutes with negation, but com­
positional axioms for double negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, uni­
versal claims, etc., and negated conjunctions, negated disjunctions, 
negated universal statements, etc. belong to KF. For instance, the compo­
sitional axiom for negated disjunctions is the following: 
8x8y ðSentL T ðxÞ ^ SentL T ðyÞ ! ðT :ðx _ yÞ $ ð:Tx ^ :TyÞÞÞ ðT:_Þ 
_ _ 
Let us now ask whether KF satisfies the criteria we set out. Is it func­
tional? KF implies instances of (uniform) disquotation for a certain class 
of expressions Δ (including all T-free sentences), so if one’s goal is to 
quantify over expressions in Δ, functionality is satisfied. Is it insubstan­
tial? We have not provided an absolute criterion of insubstantiality, 
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but one way to show it to be insubstantial would be to look for an insub­
stantial disquotational theory that implies the axioms of KF, given addi­
tional non-truth-theoretic principles a deflationist may reasonably 
endorse. 
Note that KF’s compositional axioms are unrestricted; that is, they 
govern the interaction of the truth predicate and the logical operators 
as they apply to every expression of the language. Thus, a natural 
theory of disquotation that implies them (given additional non-truth­
theoretic principles) would be the theory containing all instances of the 
T-schema. But this class of sentences is obviously not in good standing, 
for it leads to triviality. Could some other disquotational theory do the 
job? 
The short answer is yes, trivially. Recall that McGee’s trick entails 
that every sentence of L T is provably equivalent to an instance of the 
T-schema in the base theory. Thus, for every truth theory, whether com­
positional, Tarskian, disquotational, or else, there is a purely disquota­
tional theory that proves the same theorems. A fortiori, there is a 
disquotational theory that has exactly the same consequences as KF 
(even without any gap-bridging principles). However, since these theo­
ries are otherwise highly unmotivated, we have little reason to believe 
that they are themselves in good standing. 
Perhaps more interestingly, as Horsten and Leigh (2017) have shown, 
the axioms of KF can be derived by iterating GBP twice over the theory 
PTB, which extends the base theory with an instance of local disquota­
tion for each sentence of L T in which the truth predicate occurs only 
positively—i.e. under the scope of an even number of negations. 
However, whether this theory is in good standing is rather doubtful. 
Restricting the T-schema to positive instances is quite ad hoc. It isn’t 
based on any well-motivated criterion of what an acceptable instance 
is, but merely on the observation that the liar sentence and other para­
doxical expressions aren’t positive. Just like positive set theory, which 
avoids Russell’s paradox by restricting comprehension to positive 
instances, this leads to a mathematically interesting theory, but to a 
rather strange picture of truth (sets).11 Of course, one could justify 
PTB by pointing out that its axioms are derivable from KF, as  
Halbach (2014) observes, but this is of little use in the present context. 
Overall, we have little reason to believe that KF qualifies as a deflation­
ary theory of truth. 
Similar considerations apply to FS, though in this case one can actu­
ally give positive reasons to reject it. FS is the classical theory extending 
the base theory with uniform disquotation for T-free atomic expressions 
and compositional axioms for the connectives and the quantifiers just 
like CT’s, except the restriction to T-free sentences is lifted. Additionally, 
FS contains two ‘meta’-rules of inference that allow us to attach the 
truth predicate to and remove it from every theorem of the theory. As 
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is well known, FS is ω-inconsistent, i.e. it proves all instances φ(t) of a  
formula φ(x) but, at the same time, it also entails ¬8xφ(x). Thus, FS is 
in a sense unsound, as is every disquotational theory that entails the 
axioms of FS (with or without additional non-truth-theoretic principles). 
So no such disquotational theory appears to be in good standing. 
In general, we are suspicious that classical theories containing unre­
stricted compositional axioms—i.e. axioms applying to all sentences 
of the language, including those with the truth predicate—can be 
shown to follow from some insubstantial disquotational theory together 
with additional non-truth-theoretic principles. In most cases, the only 
disquotational theories that come to mind here are those obtained by 
McGee’s trick, for which it is quite doubtful that they are in good 
standing. Thus, as far as classical type-free theories are concerned, it 
would seem to be more promising to search for systems that restrict dis­
quotational or compositional principles to a proper subclass of sen­
tences of the language of truth, such as e.g. the grounded ones.12 It is 
no coincidence that the theories of truth proposed by the authors, e.g. 
Picollo (2019) or Schindler (2014), have gone in that direction. In this 
respect, non-classical theories might be at an advantage, insofar as 
they might have all instances of disquotation at their disposal, though 
this requires some further investigation. 
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Notes 
1. Should propositions be preferable to sentences, one could understand our 
truth predicate as applying not directly to the sentences but to what these 
sentences express. 
2. See, for instance, Field (2003, 2008). 
3. See, e.g. Horsten (2011). 
4. We use this terminology for lack of a better alternative: in particular, in using 
it we do not wish to suggest that truth is a distinctively logical notion; rather, 
we use it to emphasise the aim of laying down general principles governing 
the validity or correctness of inferences involving truth. 
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5. There have been several attempts to formulate general requirements on axi­
omatic theories of truth, e.g. Leitgeb (2007) and Sheard (2002); a list of 
desiderata specifically designed for deflationists has been proposed by 
Halbach and Horsten (2005). Although reasons of space prevent a direct 
comparison, it should be emphasised that our desiderata differ decidedly 
from theirs. 
6. See,	 for instance, Ramsey (1927, p. 158), Quine (1970), Grover (1972), 
Grover et al. (1975), and Azzouni (2001). 
7. This result relies on the assumption, mentioned in Section 3.2, that every 
object in the domain has a name. Again, that restriction can be lifted if we 
work with a satisfaction rather than a truth predicate. 
8. Recall that we assumed that we can prove in the base theory that for every 
object there is a term denoting this object. Again, if one wants to lift that 
restriction, one needs to work with a satisfaction predicate instead. 
9. A similar point was made by Armour-Garb and Beall (2005, Section 5.1). 
10. For an overview of axiomatic truth theories, see Halbach (2014) or Horsten 
(2011). 
11. See Schindler (2015, pp. 398–399) for further arguments against PTB. 
12. See Schindler (2020, sec. 3–4) for further discussion. 
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